ISSN 2090-3359 (Print)
ISSN 2090-3367 (Online)

Advances in Decision Sciences

Volume 24
Issue 1
March 2020

Michael McAleer

Editor-in-Chief
University Chair Professor
Asia University, Taiwan

Published by Asia University, Taiwan

ADS@ASIAUNIVERSITY

Does Political Dominance Impact Economic Inequality?*

Hang Keun Ryu**

Department of Economics
Chung Ang University
Seoul, Korea

Daniel J. Slottje

Department of Economics
Southern Methodist University
Dallas, Texas, USA

Revised: March 2020

* This research was supported by the National Research Foundation of Korea (NRF-2017S1A3A2066657). The authors thank a referee for helpful comments and suggestions, and Logan Nee for assistance in data collection.

** Corresponding author: hangryu@cau.ac.kr

Abstract

This paper examines the relationship between political dominance and economic inequality in the U.S. for the years 1947-2017. Conventional wisdom suggests that when Democrats control Congress and the Presidency, they will pursue policy goals that are inequality reducing through government actions. Republican controlled Congresses and presidencies are presumed to pursue economic growth and limited government intervention policies. However, are these beliefs true? Economic inequality is a broad term with various interpretations. In this paper we adopt a different approach. We consider the distribution of utility that individuals possess, while understanding that of course this depends in part on their income levels. We do find that Democratic presidential administrations correlate with lowering economic inequality and when Republican presidents hold the White House this correlates with increasing levels of economic inequality. However, we find that dominance by a given party in Congress has a negligible impact.

Keywords: Political party dominance; economic inequality trends; utility shifts due to presidential choice.

JEL: P16, D31, H11.

1. Introduction

While economic inequality is unequivocally just that, an economic problem, it is also a political issue, and some would argue also a philosophical issue. Indeed, French philosopher Alain Badiou (2019) has noted:

"The great traditional oppositions - Republicans versus Democrats, right versus left, conservatives versus socialists - become purely abstract, tied to a bygone era, for these supposed divisions rest on the same conviction, the same political and economic basis. All these divisions are traversed, undermined, and finally annulled by the fact, recognized by every politician and by every government, that, as far as the future of humanity is concerned, there exists one and only one path, that of global capitalism."

Interestingly, economists for the most part have left it primarily to the political scientists to analyze how, in the USA, political party dominance influences the level and trend of economic inequality, if at all.

Our paper proceeds as follows; first we review the literature here in Section One. Next, in Section Two, we present our theoretical modeling strategy of introducing an individual social utility function that depends on a given individual's relative position with respect to the distribution of income, to better capture the concept of economic inequality. In Section Three, we analyze how various cohorts (from the poorest to the richest quantiles) have fared (with respect to changes in their levels of utility) over time under different political parties by focusing on which political party occupied the White House over time.

We find that Republican presidents preside over epochs of increasing inequality and Democratic presidents seemingly preside over time periods when economic inequality decreases. Our findings suggest a paradox, that is, why do red states (presumed to be poorer) vote for Republican presidents and blue states (presumed to be richer) vote for Democratic presidents?

In Section Four we analyze if individuals in red and blue states are voting against their own self-interest? Gelman (2010) and colleagues have proffered some explanations on this issue and we discuss their findings, in the context of our own. While our discussion primarily focuses on which party occupied the Oval Office, we are also interested in the question of how congressional dominance impacts inequality, if at all. We explore this question in Section Five. The short answer is we find no empirical evidence of any impact. Finally, Section Six concludes the paper. We now review the literature.

Economists have analyzed how aggregate *macroeconomic activity* influences the level of inequality in the U.S. in work going back to Thurow (1970), Blinder and Esaki (1978), Balke and Slottje (1993) and all the way to the recent work of Piketty (2014, 2015). The latter work has focused on economic growth and on the role of capitalism. There is also a significant literature on how particular public policies impact the size distribution of income, by impacting wages and earnings.

This "micro" economic approach has been led by Murphy and Welch (1990, 1992), Heckman and colleagues (2015a,b) , Blanchflower and Oswald (1994), Card (1995), Card and Krueger (1994), Neumark and Wascher (2000, 2008), Saez (2004, 2013), Saez and Zucman (2016) and others who have focused on wage policies (minimum wage impacts), mobility, education, human capital investment, the provision of economic opportunity and on optimal taxation policies.

Concomitantly, economists have had relatively little to say on how political parties have influenced the size distribution of income in the U.S. over time. Recent work on this topic has been primarily the purview of political scientists. Thompson (2007) has written that American political thought has drifted away from its egalitarian origins to passively accepting that inequality is a consequence of the modern republic and attendant capitalism, cf. Thompson (2007), pp. 15-16.

Gilens (2012) argues that only the preferences of the wealthiest matter when it comes to policy outcomes. He is questioning whether American democracy is concerned at all about the plight

or preferences of America's least affluent citizens. He suggests that only in electing the president, do the poorest have any impact at all.

Of course, this line of questions makes it all the more interesting to see empirically if the president does in fact impact policies to the extent that they impact the level and trend of income inequality in the U.S. Reid-Henry (2015) suggests that the "origins of inequality are political and continue due to a failure of perspective to see the problem of rich countries and poor countries as imbricated… Just as inequality is a process, a more inclusive, global approach to distribution must precede more equitable outcomes."[1]

From an ***economic perspective***, conventional wisdom suggests that when Democrats control Congress and the presidency, that they will pursue policy goals that are inequality reducing through government actions. Republican controlled Congresses and presidencies are presumed to pursue economic growth and limited government intervention policies. The conventional belief is that Republicans preside over inequality increasing eras. Republicans counter that argument with the mantra that, "a rising tide lifts all boats."[2] But are these conventional beliefs true? We now explain our modeling strategy to examine these issues.

2. Modeling Strategy of an Income Share Function and Utility Function

As we are interested in understanding how political dominance impacts economic inequality, we begin our analysis by adopting a utility framework, rather than by simply analyzing the U.S. income distribution. Frank (1985) was among the first to argue that where individuals stand relative to their peers in income levels and status impacts their self-perceived levels of economic well-being. His work followed from Veblen's (1899) well-known studies on conspicuous consumption and ceremonial aspects of commodities that was formalized by

[1] This quote is from Jamie Goodwin-White (2017) in his review of Reid-Henry.

[2] Ironically, John F. Kennedy, a Democrat, is credited with this line, although his speech writer actually wrote it.

others almost one hundred years later.[3] Gelman's (2010) work is also consistent with the notion that one's relative position matters, which is why blue states are richer and lean one way politically, but voters within those states do split based on their relative economic status.

In order to account for not only income level but also relative income share, we introduce a utility framework placing income share directly in the utility function. Suppose there are *100* persons with incomes $q_1, q_2, ..., q_{100}$.

The income share of the i^{th} person is $s_i = q_i / (q_1 + q_2 + \cdots + q_{100})$. For a continuous share function $s(z)$ for $0 \le z \le 1$, the income shares of the poorest and richest persons are:

$$s_1 = \int_0^{0.01} s(z)dz \quad \text{and} \quad s_{100} = \int_{0.99}^{1} s(z)dz \,. \tag{1}$$

Suppose the utility function of a person at position z and time *t* can be written as the logarithm of income share of $s(z,t)$:

$$U(z,t) = \log\, s(z,t) \tag{2}$$

See Ryu and Slottje (2017) for the above definition. If we want to restrict the utility function to be nonnegative, then we multiply the share function with a constant such that $C\, s_{\min} = 1$ and $U' = \log[C\, s]$ is nonnegative.

If we are interested in differences in the utility function at different points of time, then the constant need not be multiplied. At a given position *z*, the utility difference between time *t* and $t + \Delta t$ is:

[3] See the work by Leibenstein (1950) and Basmann and his students (1983) on quantifying these Veblen effects.

$$
\begin{aligned}
\Delta U(z) &= U(z,t+\Delta t) - U(z,t) \\
&= \log\left[\frac{s(z,t+\Delta t)}{s(z,t)}\right] \\
&\approx \log\left[\frac{s(z,t)+s'(z,t)\Delta t}{s(z,t)}\right] \\
&= \log\left[1+\frac{s'(z,t)\Delta t}{s(z,t)}\right] \\
&\approx \frac{s'(z,t)\Delta t}{s(z,t)} \\
&= \frac{\Delta s(z,t)}{s(z,t)}
\end{aligned}
\tag{3}
$$

This means the change in utility between time *t* and $t+\Delta t$ is approximated with the relative change of the share function.

Suppose we wish to use quintile data rather than a continuous z coordinate, then the utility of the i^{th} group at time t is:

$$U_i(t) = \log\, q_i(t) \tag{4}$$

Then the utility gain between $t-1$ and t for the i^{th} group is:

$$\Delta U_i(t) = \frac{q_i(t) - q_i(t-1)}{q_i(t-1)} \tag{5}$$

Thus, we have a framework to view how changes in income quintiles will impact the utility of a given income cohort, as that cohort's income share changes over time.

3. Empirical Approach

In order to see if "the president matters in understanding trends and changes in economic inequality," we rely on U.S. Current Population Survey data of family income for the years

1947-2017, and a present a graphical analysis.[4] The U.S. Presidency generally undergoes a change in occupancy either every four or eight years. Suppose we have the first quintile q_1 shares for 1949-1957.

The income shares of q_1 (the poorest 20% of the population) were 4.5% and 5% respectively in 1950 and 1951. Using our utility framework, the lowest quintile's utility increases during this period by $(5-4.5)/4.5 = 0.1111 = 11.11\%$. Democratic President Harry Truman served from 1945-Jan 1953. Suppose we assume that one can ascribe any economic advances or changes in economic inequality leading up to 1953 to Truman's decision-making until January 1953 while the poorest quintile group q_1 has its share change between 1949 and 1953 by 0.2%.

One can reasonably interpret the utility increase of Q1 group in 1953 (4.7-4.5)/4.5=4.444% as a Democratic party "achievement."

Similarly, the utility change between 1953 and 1957 is:

$$\text{Utility increase of Q1 group } = \frac{5.1-4.7}{4.7} = 0.08511 = 8.511\%$$

and will be recorded at 1957 as a Republican achievement. We do the same analyzes for Q2, Q3, Q4, and Q5 for the entire time period from 1949-2017.

Figures 1-5 illustrate the scatter plot of utility changes of each income cohort Q1, Q2…Q5 for the entire time period 1947-2017. What will become readily apparent is that Democratic Party regimes on their face, correlate with higher utility gains for the lower quintiles while the top of the income distribution fared better with respect to their utility gains when a Republican was "running things." These results are consistent with expectations but are still a bit surprising when one would hope public policy actions of any political party would "raise all boats."

[4] The household income distribution data utilized in this paper come from the U.S Current Population Survey, https://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-series/demo/income-poverty/cps-hinc.html.

In Fig.1, the first blue dot corresponding to 1953 has a positive value of 4.444% and the next red circle corresponding to 1957 has a positive value of 8.511%. Again, this means there was a year over year increase of 4.4% in utility in the poorest quintile in 1953 and an 8.511% increase in utility year over year in 1957 for the poorest quintile. For 1947-2017, blue dots for Democratic Presidents have positive values in most cases while a Democratic President is in charge while the red circles for Republican Presidents tend to have negative values in most cases during a Republican presidency. Economic inequality appears to worsen under Republican administrations and to improve when Democrats hold the office for the poorest Americans.

The same results appear to hold for the second poorest cohort of Americans. Democratic presidents preside over periods of decreasing economic inequality and Republican presidents appear to perform worse if the policy objective is to lessen economic inequality. In Figure 3 below the same result appears to hold for the middle of the distribution (those between the 40^{th} and 60^{th} percentiles) have done worse with respect to their relative utility over time under a Republican administration.

In Figure 4 below one can see the same impact. As with the poorest 60 percent of Americans, the 80^{th} percentile of Americans also appear to fare better with respect to their relative utility levels over time with a Democrat in the White House running the country.

Interestingly, as can be seen in Figure 5, when it comes to the richest 20 percent of Americans in the U.S., one can see a clear, prima facie showing that the richest cohort does better under Republican administrations than under Democratic ones.

Figures 1-4 show graphically that the change in relative utility levels of the poorest 80% of the population have decreased over time with Republican presidents in charge in general, but the same cohorts have fared better with increasing utility levels under Democratic presidents. Fig.5 indicates the opposite result, the utility levels of the richest 20% of the population have

higher changes in utility with Republican presidents leading the nation over time but lower changes in utility levels with Democratic presidents.

4. Red State Paradox

The results suggest one interesting conundrum. It is well known that "Red States" tend to be the poorest and to have the highest levels of inequality, yet most of these states are the most reliable voters for Republican candidates. The unanswered question is why? Our results show Democrats tend to preside over epochs when economic inequality declines, yet those in the poorest states, the "red" states, vote for Republican presidential candidates. It certainly suggests that when it comes to issues of economic inequality, voters might be more concerned about other social and economic issues than about inequality.

In his excellent book, Andrew Gelman (2010), a statistician, takes a deep dive into US voter data to try to understand differences in voting behavior across states. His analysis sheds light on the seemingly paradoxical way some voters do appear to vote against their own self-interest. Why does it appear that the poorer "red" states support Republicans while the richer "blue" states are Democrat-leaning? If only income mattered, this would indeed be an odd result. But what Gelman finds is that while it appears that most of the richest voters do tend to vote Republican, as a whole richer states do not. His findings are consistent with our own, the richest Americans fare better as a group under Republican administrations and polling evidence on voter behavior that Gelman reports, supports that expectation.

However, for the non-rich, what he has uncovered is that it is ***not*** just income and expected economic gain that motivates voting behavior and tendencies, but a host of things such as religious beliefs, cultural perspective, race, age, gender and perspectives about economic inequality. His findings are troubling in that it does appear that America has become an increasingly polarized country with these various cohorts voting certain ways based on age, race, religious beliefs and gender and by region of the country; and it was happening well before Trump took office at least back to the 1990s.

Gelman updated his previous work with an analysis that dissected the 2016 US elections. Trangucci, Ali, Gelman and Rivers (2018) found that yet again religious beliefs, cultural views, gender, age and race were better predictors of voting behavior than was income. Both studies did find that voter beliefs about economic inequality do impact voting behavior, but these are manifested based on one's age, race, and so on.

While these studies analyze why voters vote the way they do, they do not necessarily answer the question we are focused on here. As always, it remains an empirical question about how political dominance impacts inequality, if at all, and while we found that which party controls the White House does matter, who controls Congress does not. Those findings seem more reasonable in the light of Gelman's findings. The heterogeneity within a state or region's voters' preferences can be masked when electing the president but will not be so when electing Congressional members. We discuss this further below.

5. Does Congressional Dominance Impact Inequality?

The dominance of a party in the U.S. House of Representatives and in the U.S. Senate has a negligible impact on the inequality changes of the population over time. This can be easily seen in Table 2, where we order the years from the lowest level of inequality (as measured by the Gini coefficient) to the highest level. As can be seen in Table 2, the Gini reached its' lowest levels in the 1960s and fluctuated until the late 1990s and throughout the first two decades of the twenty first century where inequality essentially trended upward, although the values did not change appreciably.

The U.S. Congress was, for the most part, dominated by the Democratic Party until 1994 and by the Republican Party after 1994. Regardless of which party held the majority in either the House of Representatives or the United States Senate, over time, it does not appear that there are any trends in economic inequality changes associated with Congressional dominance. For the years with the lowest levels of inequality, the Democrats controlled Congress, but not necessarily the White House, while the opposite held true in the 2000 - 2017-time frame, where the Senate tended to be under Republican control and the House of Representatives and

president fluctuated. Notice also that there is no discernible pattern regarding inequality levels where the Democrats controlled Congress and the presidency after the first few years. The same result holds for Republican control.

The negligible impact of Congress on inequality may also be due to the fact that the House flips every two years and the Senate's composition is also somewhat in flux, despite a six-year term. As a result of Gelman's (2010) findings, one would expect that senators and house members would vote as reflections of their diverse constituents (more in tune with gender, race, age, religious beliefs, gun rights, regions of country issues) than as a block on an issue like economic inequality.

For all of these reasons, there is no discernible impact on economic inequality of Congressional dominance. Doing the same graphical analysis we did in analyzing presidential impact we note that for Congress, in Figures 6-9 it can be seen that there is no discernible pattern in changes in relative utility levels mapped against who holds the Senate.

Figure 6 indicates that changes in utility levels from year to year were negligible under either political party controlling the House of Representatives and no discernible patterns emerge, for the poorest quintile over time. The same results hold for the richest quintiles with respect to control of the House of Representatives as can be seen in Figure 7. Figures 8 and 9 repeat the exercise for the U.S. Senate and indicate neither political party having any discernible impact.

This contextually is in sharp contrast to the findings from the effect of the U.S. President and his party as shown in Figs. 1-5. In the U.S., presidents primarily initiate economic policy changes (when his party holds the Senate or House or both) and the House and Senate will either ratify or oppose the president's policies. Through regulatory bodies and by use of executive orders the president can initiate change, whereas the House or Senate must get bi-cameral support and then get the president to sign off on a bill. If the president opposes it, the Congress needs strong majorities to overrule the Commander-in-Chief's veto, which it (Congress) can almost never can do. If all these reasons, Congress does not appear to impact economic inequality trends over time.

6. Conclusion

In this paper we presented a theoretical modeling strategy of introducing an individual social utility function that depends on a given individual's relative position with respect to the distribution of income, to better capture the concept of economic inequality. We found, using a graphical approach, that Republican presidents preside over epochs of increasing inequality and Democratic presidents preside over time periods when economic inequality decreases. We also attempted to explain the seemingly paradoxical finding that poor states appear to be red and rich states appear to be blue and they seemingly are voting against their own self-interest.

Howver, such a finding only holds if maximizing income is the driving factor in voter preferences. They are not voting against their own self-interests because income does not appear to be the most important factor influencing their voting behavior as Gelman (2010) and colleagues have explained; issues of gender, race, religion and cultural beliefs also play a role. While our discussion focused on which party occupied the Oval Office, we were also interested in the question of how congressional dominance impacts inequality.

We found no empirical evidence of any impact. This result is likely due to the heterogeneity in beliefs and objectives of voters across Congressional regional districts and at the state level, as well as due to the relatively short time a Congress is in power and can actually initiate political change.

References

Badiou, A. (2019), *Trump*, New York: John Wiley Publishing, p. 10.

Balke, N. and D. Slottje (1993), "Poverty and Change in the Macroeconomy: A Dynamic Macroeconometric Model," *The Review of Economics and Statistics*, vol. 75: 117-122.

Blinder, A. and H. Esaki (1978), "Macroeconomic Activity and Income Distribution in the Postwar United States," *The Review of Economics and Statistics*, Vol. 60: 604-609.

Blanchflower, D. and A. Oswald (1994), *The Wage Curve*, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Card, D. (1995), "The Wage Curve: A Review," *Journal of Economic Literature*, Vol. 33: 785-799.

Card, D. and A. Krueger (1994), "Minimum Wages and Unemployment: A Case Study of the Fast Food Industry," *American Economic Review*, Vol. 84: 772-793.

Frank, R. (1985), *Choosing the Right Pond: Human Behavior and the Quest for Status*, New York: Oxford University Press.

Gelman, A. (2010), *red state blue state rich state poor state*, Princeton: Princeton University Press

Gilens, M. (2012), *Affluence & Influence: Economic Inequality and Political Power in America*. Princeton: Princeton University Press and the Russell Sage Foundation.

Goodwin-White, J. (2017), "A Review of Political Origins of Inequality by Reid-Henry," *Economic Geography*, Vol. 93: 319 – 321.

Heckman, J., P. Eisenhauer and E. Vytlacil (2015), "The Generalized Roy Model and the Cost-Benefit Analysis of Social Programs," *Journal of Political Economy*, Vol. 123: 413-443.

Heckman, J. and M. Sattinger (2015), "Introduction to The Distribution of Earnings and of Individual Output by A. D. Roy," *Economic Journal*, Vol. 125: 378- 402.

Leibenstein, H. (1950), "Bandwagon, Snob and Veblen Effects in the Theory of Consumer Demand," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, Vol. 64: 183-207.

Murphy, K. And F. Welch (1990), "Empirical Age-Earnings Profiles," *Journal of Labor Economics*, Vol. 8: 202-229.

Murphy, K. and F. Welch (1992), "The Structure of Wages," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, Vol. 107: 285-326.

Neumark, D. and W. Wascher (2000), "Reply to Card and Krueger," *American Economic Review*, Vol. :1362-1396.

Neumark, D. and W. Wascher (2008), *Minimum Wages*, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Piketty, T, (2014), *Capital in the 21st century*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Piketty, T. (2015), "Putting the study of the distribution back at the center of economics," *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, Vol. 29: 67-88.

Reid-Henry, S. (2016), *The Political Origins of Inequality: Why a more equal world is better for us all* , Chicago: Chicago University Press.

Ryu, H. and D. Slottje (2017), "*Income Inequality vs Utility Inequality,"* Communications in Statistics 46, pp. 3631-3640.

Saez, E. (2004), "The Optimal Treatment of Tax Expenditures," *Journal of Public Economics*, Vol. 88: 2657-2684.

Saez, E. (2013), "Optimal Progressive Capital Income Taxes in the Infinite Horizon Model," *Journal of Public Economics*, Vol. 97: 61-74.

Saez, E. and G. Zucman (2016), "Wealth Inequality in the United States since 1913: Evidence from Capitalized Income Tax Data", *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, Vol. 131: 519-578.

Thompson, M. (2007), *The Politics of Inequality: A Political History of the Idea of Economic Inequality in America*, New York: Columbia University Press.

Thurow, L. (1970). "Analyzing the American Income Distribution," *American Economic Review*, Vol. 60: 261-269.

Trangucci, R., I. Ali, A. Gelman and D. Rivers (2018), Voting patterns in 2016: Exploration using multilevel regression and poststratification (MRP) on pre-election polls, unpublished mimeo.

Veblen, T. (1899), *Theory of the Leisure Class*, London: MacMillan Publishers.

Fig. 1 Utility change of Q1 group under different Presidencies



Fig.2 Utility change of Q2 group under different Presidencies



Fig.3 Utility change of Q3 group under different Presidencies



Fig.4 Utility change of Q4 group under different Presidencies



Fig.5 Utility change of Q5 group under different Presidencies



Fig.6 Utility change of Q1 and party dominance in the House



Fig.7 Utility change of Q5 and party dominance in the House



Fig.8 Utility change of Q1 and Party dominace in the Senate



Fig.9 Utility change of Q5 and party dominance of the Senate



Table 1

The poorest quintile and U.S. President

Year	q_1 share in percent	President
1949	4.5	Democratic Harry Truman
1950	4.5	Democratic Harry Truman
1951	5	Democratic Harry Truman
1952	4.9	Democratic Harry Truman
1953	4.7	Republican Dwight Eisenhower
1954	4.5	Republican Dwight Eisenhower
1955	4.8	Republican Dwight Eisenhower
1956	5	Republican Dwight Eisenhower
1957	5.1	Republican Dwight Eisenhower

Table 2

Political Parties of Presidents and dominant parties of Congress

Year	Gini Coefficient	White House	Senate	House
1968	0.348	D	D	D
1966	0.349	D	D	D
1969	0.349	R	D	D
1957	0.351	R	D	D
1970	0.353	R	D	D
1958	0.354	R	D	D
1971	0.355	R	D	D
1974	0.355	R	D	D
1965	0.356	D	D	D
1973	0.356	R	D	D
1975	0.357	R	D	D
1956	0.358	R	D	D
1967	0.358	D	D	D
1976	0.358	R	D	D
1953	0.359	R	R	R
1972	0.359	R	D	D
1959	0.361	R	D	D
1964	0.361	D	D	D
1962	0.362	D	D	D
1963	0.362	D	D	D
1951	0.363	D	D	DR
1955	0.363	R	D	D
1977	0.363	D	D	D
1978	0.363	D	D	D
1960	0.364	R	D	D

1979	0.365	D	D	D
1980	0.365	D	D	D
1952	0.368	D	D	DR
1981	0.369	R	R	D
1948	0.371	D	R	R
1954	0.371	R	R	R
1961	0.374	D	D	D
1947	0.376	D	R	R
1949	0.378	D	D	D
1950	0.379	D	D	D
1982	0.38	R	R	D
1983	0.382	R	R	D
1984	0.383	R	R	D
1985	0.389	R	R	D
1986	0.392	R	R	D
1987	0.393	R	D	D
1988	0.395	R	D	D
1990	0.396	R	D	D
1991	0.397	R	D	D
1989	0.401	R	D	D
1992	0.404	R	D	D
1995	0.421	D	R	R
1996	0.425	D	R	R
1994	0.426	D	D	D
1993	0.429	D	D	D
1997	0.429	D	R	R
1999	0.429	D	R	R
1998	0.43	D	R	R
2007	0.432	R	DR	D
2000	0.433	D	R	R

2002	0.434	R	DR	R
2001	0.435	R	DR	R
2003	0.436	R	R	R
2004	0.438	R	R	R
2008	0.438	R	DR	D
2005	0.44	R	R	R
2010	0.44	D	D	D
2009	0.443	D	D	D
2006	0.444	R	R	R
2013	0.448	D	D	R
2015	0.448	D	R	R
2017	0.449	R	R	R
2011	0.45	D	D	R
2012	0.451	D	D	R
2014	0.452	D	D	R
2016	0.452	D	R	R

Note: D means the Democratic party and R means the Republican party. DR means the number of Democratic members is the same as the number of Republican members.